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“In dealing with the correspondence of Leibniz and 
Bernoulli, I have not been mainly influenced by the 
historical interest of it. The view of Leibniz, dwelling 
mainly on considerations of analogy, and demanding 
‘not so much mathematical subtlety as a precise 
statement of all circumstances’, is, substantially, the 
view which will be supported in the following chapters. 
The desire of Bernoulli for an exact formula, which 
would derive from the numerical frequency of the 
experimental results a numerical measure of their 
probability, preludes the exact formulas of later and 
less cautious mathematicians” 





1.  Introduction  
 
Keynes played a central role in the debate on the emerging econometric methods in the late 1930s. 
In particular, his 1939 critique of Tinbergen’s first League of Nations study is considered to have 
sparked off the debate about the role of econometrics (Hendry and Morgan 1995), which saw him 
involved in direct exchanges with some of the other leading figures of the emerging field of 
econometrics.  After an initial phase in which his objections were constructively discussed, since 
the early 1940s they were substantially rejected, and his attitude towards economics considered old-
fashioned.  
The assessment of Keynes's criticism remains controversial, but the long prevailing view is that 
Keynes was an a priori anti-econometrician (see Samuelson 1948 and Klein 1951). Stone (1978) 
maintained that Keynes’ review was "a model of testiness and perverseness" (p. 61) principally due 
to his temperamental characteristics.
 Since the end of the 1970s new contributions have recognised 
the relevance of Keynes’s criticism. However, they concentrated on those remarks of his which 
dealt with 'technical issues' involved with applying regression (e.g., omitted variable bias, 
                                                 
1 The paper synthesizes and develops a previous paper (Garrone and Marchionatti 2004). We are grateful to Giuseppe 
Bertola, Bruno Contini, Marco Dardi, Geoffrey Harcourt, Mary Morgan, Jan Toporowski for their useful comments. 
Special thanks are due to the librarian and staff of the Modern Archives, King’s College, Cambridge, where the Keynes’ 
papers are kept,  for their kind assistance in our archival research. Financial support from MURST is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
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simultaneous equation bias, and so on). It was Patinkin (1976) who first  found it “somewhat 
depressing to see how many of [Keynes’s criticisms to the use of correlation analysis to estimate 
equations] are, in practice, still of relevance today” (p. 1095).  Hendry (1980) wrote that 
"[Keynes’s] objections make an excellent list of what might be called problems of the linear 
regression model” (p. 396).  Some years later Pesaran-Smith (1985) recognised that Keynes was 
right on both the technical and logical arguments; and  Rowley (1988) maintained that “Keynes’ 
criticisms have been diluted, forgotten or mis-stated rather than absorbed into the prevalent 
orthodoxy” (p. 25). He regretted that “we have waited too long for econometric methodology to 
come of age and address its logical bases” (p. 30). Actually, it is in this wider context that Keynes 
has been considered in the 1990s. McAleer (1994) writes that “some of Keynes’s criticisms of 
Tinbergen’s pioneering econometric methodology remain relevant to this day” (p. 332) and that his 
implicit research program  “subsequently led to the development of numerous econometric 
techniques that are now widely used in applied econometrics” (p. 334). Similarly Keuzenkamp 
(2000) maintains that Keynes’s sceptical attitude remains substantially justified. In conclusion, it is 
recognised that Keynes’s criticism of Tinbergen was sound in many points. However, it is 
considered too harsh and Keynes is blamed for throwing out the baby with the bath water.  
This article reconstructs Keynes’s reflections on the issue of the role of econometrics in the 
economic discourse in a time perspective longer than is usually considered in the literature. In the 
second section his conception of economics and the role of mathematics and statistics is presented, 
as a necessary premise to understanding Keynes’s criticism. In the third and fourth sections we 
analyse respectively the Keynes-Tinbergen debate in the period 1938-1940 and the exchange 
between Keynes and other econometricians in the period 1939-1941. The last section provides some 
final remarks on Keynes’s alleged anti-econometrics attitude and an interpretation of the reasons of 
the harshness of his criticism.  
 
 
2.  A preliminary note. Keynes on the nature of economics and the role of 
mathematics and statistics   
  
Keynes’s mature methodological conception dates from the early 1930s, when he was constructing 
the model of his General Theory. It can be traced  throughout the drafts of his book, in its final text, 
and in other writings and in his correspondence before and after the General Theory. His 1938 
correspondence with Harrod  is particularly relevant from this point of view.  In a letter of the 4
th of   3
July, 1938,  Keynes defined economics as “a branch of logic, a way of thinking” (Keynes 1973b, p. 
296), and added: 
 
“Economics is a science of thinking in terms of models joined to the art of choosing models which are relevant to the 
contemporary world. It is compelled to be this, because, unlike the typical natural science, the material to which is 
applied is, in too many respects, not homogeneous through time” (ibid. p. 297, italics added).   
  
Changing and unstable factors like “motives, expectations and psychological uncertainties” (ibid. p. 
300), which act in a context of limited knowledge of actors and structural uncertainty, make 
economic material, “in too many respects”, “not homogeneous through time”.  As a consequence 
“economics is essentially a moral science [i.e. a human science]  and not a natural science. That is 
to say, it employs introspection and judgement of value” (ibid).  Hence, the non-homogeneity of the 
material through time compels economics to take the particular characteristics of the historical 
world into account and to use introspection and judgement of value in order to discover the relevant 
factors necessary for building a model. The relevant model does not emerge automatically out of 
empirical study, as if it were a result of a “blind” manipulation of data (see Keynes 1936, p. 297). 
The adequacy of the model depends on the economist’s ability to select the relevant factors. The 
decision over what part of concrete reality to incorporate into a model was what Keynes termed 
“judgement of value”. The model is the result of a continuous correction of judgement, “a mixture 
of intuitive selection and formal principles.” Keynes emphasised that the selection of the relevant 
factors begins with the analysis of facts, and that  economists must continuously refer to facts: 
 
“The specialist in the manufacture of models will not be successful unless he is constantly correcting his judgement by 
intimate and messy acquaintance with the facts to which his model has to be applied” (letter to Harrod, 16 July 1938, 
Keynes 1973b, p. 300).  
   
Keynes was not going to refuse the use of mathematics in economics per se. He appreciated the 
contributions in the field when they make it possible to illuminate economic problems -- that is 
when the subject matter makes its use appropriate.
2  However, according to him, mathematical 
generalisations have primarily an instrumental role, especially in order to “disclose gaps and 
imperfections in your thought” (Keynes 1936, p. 305). This is due to the particular nature of 
economic material, which , as a rule, makes a complete and exact generalisation not possible. “In a 
study so complex as economics … we cannot hope to make completely accurate generalisations”, 
                                                 
2 This is the case, for example, with Ramsey’s economic-mathematical works. Keynes wrote that “A Mathematical 
Theory of Saving” (1928) was “one of the most remarkable contributions to mathematical economics ever made, both 
in respect of the intrinsic importance and difficulty of its subject, the power and elegance of the technical methods 
employed, and the clear purity of illumination with which the writer’s mind is felt by the reader to play about its 
subject” (Keynes, 1928, p. 335-6, emphasis added).    4
he wrote in the General Theory (ibid., p. 247) -.  As a consequence the economist’s style of 
exposition has to be quasi-formal, as Keynes wrote in an early fragment of the preface of the 
General Theory (Keynes 1973a, p. 296-8), echoing Marshall’s statements.    
For Keynes statistics has an instrumental role in economics too: “Statistics are of fundamental 
importance to suggest theories, to test them and make them convincing .. and to eliminate 
impressionism” (Keynes 1971 [1930], vol.2, p. 366) - that is to increase their accuracy.
3  In the 
General Theory he called for a statistical examination of some key concepts like the propensity to 
consumption and the multiplier. Keynes himself made some preliminary attempts to verify the 
stability of the consumption function, using early national income data developed for the United 
Kingdom by Colin Clark and for the United States by Simon Kuznets. These quantitative research 
projects are very important in improving economic theory. The economists, as he wrote to Harrod,  
must not be “reluctant to soil [his] hands” (16 July1938, in Keynes 1973b, p. 300).  
On the contrary, Keynes considered that prediction was not the main object of the statistician. To 
understand this statement, it is necessary to refer to his discussion of statistical inference in Part V 
of his earlier work, the Treatise on Probability (1921)
4. The starting point of Keynes’s analysis was 
the historical discussion of the theorem  that permits to derive a numerical measure of probability 
from a numerical statistical frequency of similar events that had been observed previously -- that is 
to infer an exact measure of probability from observed frequency. According to him this theorem 
“is only valid subject to stricter qualifications … and in conditions which are the exception, not the 
rule” (ibid. p. 369).
5  Moreover, he emphasised, “it cannot possibly be inferred from a statement of 
the number of trials and the frequency of occurrence merely, that [these conditions] have been 
satisfied” (ibid., p. 404-5). In fact, he added, “we must know, for instance, that the examined 
instances are similar in the main relevant particulars, both to one another and to the unexamined 
instances to which we intend our conclusion to be applicable. An unanalysed statement of 
frequency cannot tell us this” (ibid., p. 405). Keynes’s conclusion was that “the application of the 
mathematical methods .. to the general problem of statistical inference is invalid” (ibid. p. 419). He 
wrote:  
 
                                                 
3 Two years before, reviewing in Economic Journal (1928) an important NBER publication by Frederick Mills on the 
behaviour of prices in United States over the period 1890-1925, Keynes defined this volume as “a pioneer work in that 
kind of quantitative observation which has provided the basis on which other subjects have been turned into accurate 
sciences ... If economic theory was armed with books of this kind ... the hopes of progress would unquestionably 
increased” (Keynes, 1928, p. 226, emphasis added). 
4 An exhaustive account and extensive discussion of  the inductive reasoning in the Treatise on Probability is in 
Carabelli (1988). See also Lawson (1985), Klant (1989) and Bateman (1990).  
5 They include assumptions like the assumption that a knowledge of what has occurred at some of the trials would not 
affect the probability of what may occur at any of the others and that probabilities are all equal a priori: this implies that 
the typical example for the valid application of the Bernoulli’s theorem is that of balls drawn from a single urn, 
containing black and white balls in a known proportion, and replaced after each drawing.   5
Our state of knowledge about our material must be positive, not negative, before we can proceed to such definite 
conclusions as they purport to justify. To apply these [mathematical] methods to material, unanalysed in respect of the 
circumstances of its origin, and without reference to our general body of knowledge, merely on the basis of arithmetic 
… can only lead to error and to delusion (ibid., p. 419) 
 
In his statement, Keynes echoed Leibniz’s view against Bernoulli’s, that demanded “not so much 
mathematical subtlety as a precise statement of all the circumstances” (ibid., p. 403). The problem 
is “part of the general problem of founding judgements of probability upon experience, and can 
only be dealt with by the general methods of induction” (ibid., p. 400), which he expounded in Part 
III of Treatise. There Keynes maintained that  “the validity and reasonable nature of inductive 
generalisation is ... a question of logic and not of experience, of formal and not of material laws” 
(ibid., p. 246): 
 
“The validity of every induction depends, not on a matter of fact [the empirical confirmation], but on the existence of a 
relation of probability. An inductive argument affirms, not that a certain matter of facts is so, but that relative to certain 
evidence there is a probability in its favour” (ibid., p. 245) 
 
The inductive hypothesis is logically founded on the principle of limited independent variety. It 
states that, as the number of independent constituents of a system, together with the laws of 
necessary connection, become more numerous, inductive arguments become less applicable (ibid., 
pp. 279-80). For inductive inference the propositions that constitute the premises of an inductive 
argument must have a high degree of limited independent variety, or, we may say, homogeneity. In 
other words, an object of inductive inference should not be infinitely complex (ibid., pp. 286-7). 
The reason for this fundamental requirement is that strictly positive prior probabilities are assessed 
by analogy. The importance of analogy in inductive reasoning is strongly emphasised by Keynes, 
who, in this case, deepened Hume’s conception. If every fact has its own cause (or generator), then 
the method of reasoning by means of analogy breaks down, and induction becomes impossible. 
Only with regard to finite independent variety systems, “probable knowledge can be validly 
obtained by means of an inductive argument” (ibid., p. 280).
  
According to Keynes, the acceptance of the hypothesis that the character of the system of nature is 
finite necessarily involves the acceptance of an additional assumption, the hypothesis about the 
atomic character of natural law. This implies that inductive methods are not applicable in those 
cases where the system is an organic complex. Discussing Edgeworth’s Mathematical Psychics, 
Keynes (1973 [1926]) wrote that “the atomic hypothesis ... has worked so splendidly in physics”, 
but it “breaks down in psychics”. In fact: 
   6
“We are faced at every turn with the problems of organic unity, of discreteness, of discontinuity – the whole is not equal 
to the sum of the parts, comparisons of quantity fail us, small changes produce large effects, the assumptions of a 
uniform and homogeneous continuum are not satisfied” (Keynes  (1973 [1926]), p. 262). 
 
The points considered here provide a background to understanding Keynes’s logical criticism of 
Tinbergen’s econometrics of business cycle. Actually, the most important examples discussed in the 
General Theory, in which the characteristics of non-homogeneity and complexity of the material 
make it not analysable in a formalised way, are the cases of long-term expectations and the business 
cycle. Long-term expectations depend on the most probable forecast that the agents can make and 
on the confidence with which they make that forecast. Confidence is defined in terms of “how 
highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite wrong”. Our knowledge of the 
future is often “fluctuating, vague and uncertain”. In presence of such uncertainty “there is no 
scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever” -- that is, it is not possible to 
use a probabilistic theory of expectations. In presence of such uncertainty “it is reasonable to be 
guided to a considerable degree by the facts we feel somewhat confident about”. Agents have to fall 
back on conventional judgement and animal spirits, or more precisely, to neither rational nor 
irrational motives (see Marchionatti 1999). Expectations are very important in business cycles 
phenomena which, in Keynes’s view, are determined by investment. As expectations and 
investment cannot be modelled with probabilistic relations, also the business cycle too seems to be 
beyond the domain of probabilistic inference.    
 
 
3.  The Keynes-Tinbergen debate on econometric method  
 
3.1. Tinbergen's econometric approach 
 
Tinbergen 1939 report for the League of Nations, Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories, 
represented a fundamental  contribution to the contemporary statistical and econometric research on 
business cycle, an increasingly important subject at that time
6.
 It was also an innovative contribution 
from the point of view of testing procedures  (Morgan 1990, p.108-114). The work was expected 
                                                 
6 In the 1920s institutions like NBER and IFO were established to study business cycles in a descriptive way. Yule 
(1927), Slutsky (1937), Frisch (1933b) elaborated theoretical models. Yule and Slutsky showed that exogenous shocks 
can generate cyclical patterns. Frisch proposed a propagation-impulse model of business cycle.  Tinbergen build in 
1936 a macroeconomic model for the Dutch economy, of which a simplified version was published in English in a 
small volume entitled An Econometric Approach to Business Cycle Problems (1937). Tinbergen’s may be considered an 
intermediate approach in order to close the gap between economists and mathematicians in the statistical study of 
business cycles.  
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both to provide general economic forecasts and to guide government policies to control business 
cycle (Epstein 1987). 
The first volume of the report, on which Keynes chose to focus, contained an explanation of the 
method of econometric testing and a demonstration of what could be achieved in three case studies. 
Tinbergen presented the method of his econometric study, a synthesis of statistical business cycle 
research and quantitative economic theory, in the spirit of Econometrica's program. In Chapter 1 he 
distinguished the role of the statistician from that of economist. The latter hands over the theories to 
the statistician to submit them to examination. This means that the “responsibility” for the theories 
lies with the economist.  As a consequence “the sense in which the statistician can provide 
‘verification’ of a theory is a limited one” (Tinbergen 1939a, p.12). On the other hand the role of 
the statistician is not confined to ‘verification’, but also to the discovery of what causes are 
operative and how strongly each of them operates. This is the problem of ‘measurement’.   
Secondly, Tinbergen defined the form in which  an economic theory must be expressed in order to 
be verified. It must be expressed in quantitative form, which restricts the inquiry to the examination 
of measurable phenomena.
7  Moreover in order to inquire about business cycle, it must be a 
dynamic theory. It must be one which “deals with the short-term reactions of one variate upon 
others but without neglecting the lapse of time between cause and effect” (ibid., p. 13). The 
equation in which it is expressed relates to non-simultaneous events: the form taken is described as 
‘sequence analysis’.  To the extent that the additions to static theory are the result of statistical 
research, we may say that ‘the statistician may supply theoretical suggestions to the economist” 
(ibid., p. 14).   In Chapter 2 Tinbergen outlined the technical method of multiple correlation analysis 
by applying it to an economic business cycle theory translated into a parametrised mathematical-
economic model.  Then he tested for the plausibility of the parameter estimates. Finally, he checked 
the outcomes generated by the system as a whole to see whether a theory provides a business cycle 
mechanism or not. Tinbergen was interested in testing the economic importance of results. Namely, 
he investigated whether particular effects have a plausible sign and are quantitatively important. If 
so, significance tests were used to assess the statistical accuracy of estimates. In Chapter 3 
Tinbergen discussed the results obtained in applying the method to the relation and indicated the 
proximate objective causes of changes in investment activity “looked at from the side of 
entrepreneurs and public authority” (ibid., p. 34). The analysis was made in three case studies -- on 
general investment, investment in residential building and in railway rolling-stock.    
 
                                                 
7"The inquiry is, by its nature, restricted to the examination of measurable phenomena. Non-measurable phenomena 
may, of course, at times exercise an important influence on the course of events; and the results of the present analysis 
must be supplemented by such information about the extent of that influence as can be obtained from other sources"  
(Tinbergen 1939a, p. 11).   8
3.2. The Keynes-Tinbergen debate, 1938-1940    
 
3.2.1. The story of the debate 
The Keynes-Tinbergen debate went through two different phases. The first one took place in the 
short period between August and September 1938. It had a semi-private character, and took the 
form of an exchange of letters between Keynes, Tinbergen and other economists and League of 
Nations officers. The second phase took place between September 1939 and March 1940 and was 
marked by Keynes’s review of the Tinbergen’s first volume of the book, published in the September 
issue of  the Economic Journal, and by Tinbergen’s reply.  
The story begins on August 11, 1938, when Keynes received a letter from R. Tyler, of the League 
of Nations, who wrote that he was sending him a proof copy of the  book written by Tinbergen in 
order “to obtain from you any criticism you might have” (Keynes Papers, CO/11/291).  Keynes was 
already acquainted with Tinbergen’s work – as it is witnessed by letters in July and early August 
1938 to Roy Harrod.
8 Unlike Harrod, who seemed to be in favour of Tinbergen’s work, Keynes 
expressed perplexities, essentially based on his view on the appropriate role of mathematics and 
statistics, and his negative evaluation of the recent evolution in their application in economics. After 
a first reading of the proofs, Keynes’s judgement was negative. In some letters to Kahn and Harrod 
(respectively in Keynes 1973b, p. 289 and p. 331-2) he declared that, “so far as I can understand the 
matter”, Tinbergen's work was "all hocus" (letter to Kahn, 23 August 1938, in Keynes 1973b, p. 
289) -“it is almost pure hocus”, Keynes wrote to Harrod (letter of 23 August 1938, in Keynes 
1973b, p.332) -, because "there is not the slightest explanation or justification of the underlying 
logic" (letter to Kahn, 23 August 1938, in Keynes 1973b, p. 289). These early negative impressions 
were confirmed  in a long letter to R. Tyler two weeks later, the 23
rd of August (in Keynes1973b, p. 
285-289), in which Keynes outlined the fundamental lines of his criticism of Tinbergen’s method of 
analysis. He recognised the importance of testing “the quantitative influence of factors suggested by 
a theory” (ibid. p. 289), but he pointed out the issue of the correct method to be employed. 
On September 12, 1938, Tinbergen - who had received Keynes’s comments through A. Loveday, 
director of the Financial Section of Economic Intelligence Service - wrote to Keynes replying to his 
critiques. He thought that there was  “some misunderstanding behind some of [Keynes’] 
questions”(Keynes 1973b, p. 291) but recognised that “It is difficult to meet [Keynes’] remarks on 
methodology in general” (ibid.), thus preferring to discuss technical questions.  The reading of 
                                                 
8 Harrod had taken some part in discussing Tinbergen’s work for the League of Nations and participated to a small 
meeting of experts held in Cambridge in July 1938 and then at the Cambridge meeting of the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science in early August 1938 (see letters of Harrod to Tinbergen, 20 January 1938, and Loveday to 
Harrod, 30 May 1938, in Harrod 2003) in which a draft of Tinbergen’s book was a subject of discussion.   9
Tinbergen’s letter supported Keynes’s critical feeling that the work was methodologically weak, 
which made the results obtained of little practical value:  
 
“I have had a letter from Tinbergen, which deals very frankly with my points. But the upshot is that the results are very 
much what I supposed them to be. The mistake he is making, I think, is in being too ambitious in regard to the material 
to which he his applying his method, and too premature in applying it at all until the general question of its validity has 
been established” (emphasis added) letter to Loveday, September 20, 1938, (Keynes’ Papers, CO/11/319)   
 
Replying to Tinbergen on the same day, Keynes wrote:  
 
"I hope you will continue your investigations. But I do emphasise the consideration that very little practical weight 
ought to be given to your provisional conclusions pending a justification of the application of your general method to 
statistics of the character and quality in question” (Keynes 1973b, p. 293-4).    
 
Therefore, Keynes concluded that Tinbergen had to demonstrate first of all that his method was 
applicable, rather than simply applying it. His letter to Harrod, on 13 September 1938 ended the 
first phase of his criticism to Tinbergen: 
 
“I will await Tinbergen’s revised version ... If Tinbergen was a private research student, he would deserve every 
encouragement. It is certainly worth his while pursuing all this. But I think it very dangerous for a collection of 
responsible economists to give it any sort of imprimatur in its present stage” (Keynes 1973b, p. 304, emphasis added).    
 
In the September 1939 issue of the Economic Journal, one year after their first exchange, Keynes 
published a long review of Tinbergen's just published work, “limited to an explanation of the 
statistical method which is proposed to employ” (ibid., p. 306).    
In a letter to Keynes of December 18, 1939, Tinbergen expressed his astonishment for Keynes’s 
harsh reaction to his work:  
 
“I must frankly admit I had expected you to be nearer to this type of work. There are some features in your work, viz. 
realism and focussing on the broad lines, which I also see as characteristic for this sort of econometric business cycle 
research”.  
 
He extensively replied to Keynes’s “serious” questions in  the March 1940 issue of the Economic 
Journal.
9  In his “comment” (Keynes 1973b) Keynes defined Tinbergen’s reply “very valuable”, 
                                                 
9In the same 1940, at the invitation of the editors of the Review of Economic Studies, Tinbergen also wrote a paper “to 
go into some more detail concerning the method” of analysis. It offers a restatement of the method and integrates 
Tinbergen’s reply to Keynes. In particular, Tinbergen emphasises the flexibility of his method  (Tinbergen 1940b, p. 
236).   10
but not adequate to answer his questions persuasively. Nevertheless, he declared (no doubt a bit 
ironically)  that he was in favour of the continuation of Tinbergen’s type of research: “Newton, 
Boyle and Locke all played with alchemy. So let [Tinbergen] continue” (ibid. p. 320). 
 
3.2.2. Keynes’s criticism 
 
Keynes (1973b [1938] and 1939) first posed the central question: the “question of methodology” in 
general -  that is, “the logic of applying the method of multiple correlation to unanalysed economic 
material, which we know to be non–homogeneous through time” (Keynes 1973b, p. 285). Then, he 
discussed specific issues: the comprehensiveness of the factors, their independence and 
measurability, the constancy of the coefficients and the time-lags. He concluded by going back to 
the methodological question, raising the problem of passing from statistical description to inductive 
generalisation.
 On some points Keynes’s critique shows his limited knowledge of the developments 
of the econometric literature in the previous two decades (despite the fact that Keynes was on the 
editorial board of Econometrica since 1933) and a few misunderstandings on technical issues. This 
fact is well known and widely emphasised (see for example Hendry and Morgan 1995). Here we 
focus instead on the essential points of Keynes’s criticism, which may be considered long-lived in a 
historical perspective. 
Keynes wrote that the logical condition for using the method of multiple correlation is the existence 
of “numerically measurable, independent forces, adequately analysed” -- that is, “independent 
atomic factors and between them completely comprehensive, acting with fluctuating relative 
strength on material constant and homogeneous through time”.  However, he continued, “we know 
that every one of these conditions is far from being satisfied by the economic material under 
investigation". Hence "how far does this impair the validity of the method ? This seems to me to 
deserve a most careful preliminary enquiry” (ibid., p. 285-6). Unfortunately Tinbergen’s discussion 
appeared “grievously disappointing”:   
 
“it leaves unanswered many questions which the economist is bound to ask before he can feel comfortable as to the 
conditions which the economic material has to satisfy, if the proposed method is to be properly applicable” (Keynes 
1939, p. 306) 
   11
Keynes then examined the issue in detail and raised a set of questions about the conditions of 
validity of Tinbergen’s procedures
 10.  
The first condition Keynes pointed at was the completeness of significant causes: “is it assumed that 
the factors investigated are comprehensive and that they are not merely a partial selection out of all 
the factors at work?” (1973b, p. 286-7). If they are not all included, the estimated coefficients suffer 
from omitted variable bias. If they are included, and if “the economist has correctly analysed 
beforehand the qualitative character of the causal relations”, then he can examine their quantitative 
importance, i.e. how strongly each of them operates. This is for Keynes the primary role of 
econometrics. It is quite different to affirm, as Tinbergen did, that the statistical test can prove a 
theory to be incorrect, or incomplete – that is to falsify a theory - by showing that it does not cover 
a particular set of facts.
11  In addition, Keynes (1940) raised the related problem of testing theories 
when different econometric specifications can be derived from a theory: 
 
“the seventy translators of the Septuagint were shut up in seventy separate rooms with the Hebrew text and brought out 
with them, when they emerged, seventy identical translations. Would the same miracle be vouchsafed if seventy 
multiple correlators were shut up with the same statistical material ? And anyhow, I suppose, if each had a different 
economist perched on his a priori, that would make a difference to the outcome” (ibid. p. 155-6) 
 
The second condition is that all the significant factors are measurable. Keynes wondered what place 
was left for expectations, for the state of confidence relating to the future and for non-numerical 
factors, such as inventions, politics, labour troubles, wars, financial crises. He felt the suspicion 
“that the choice of factors is influenced .. by what statistics are available, and that many vital factors 
are ignored because they are statistically intractable or unprocurable” (letter to Tyler, 23 August 
1938, in Keynes 1973b, p. 287). Keynes noted  that according to Tinbergen “the method can be 
usefully applied if some of the factors are measurable, the results obtained from examining these 
factors being ‘supplemented’ by other information” (Keynes 1939, p. 309). But “how can this be 
done ? He does not tell us” (ibid.). 
The third question concerned the independence of factors. First of all Keynes raised the problem of 
spurious correlation: “If we are using factors which are not wholly independent, we lay ourselves 
open to the .. complications of ‘spurious’ correlation” – a term introduced by K. Pearson (1897) in a 
discussion of correlation between indices. He then raised the problems of simultaneity and 
multicollinearity: 
                                                 
10 Keynes also cites the inadequacy of statistics – an “obvious” difficulty: “These many doubts are superimposed on the 
frightful inadequacy of most of the statistics employed, a difficulty so obvious and so inevitable that it is scarcely worth 
while to dwell on it” (Keynes 1939, p. 317).  
11 The question of whether testing can prove a theory to be correct is not controversial. Both Keynes and Tinbergen 
agree that testing cannot prove the correctness of a theory, whatsoever amount of empirical evidence is available.   12
 
“What happens if the phenomenon under investigation itself reacts on the factors by which we are explaining it ?  When 
he investigates the fluctuations of investment, Tinbergen makes them dependent on the fluctuations of profit. But what 
happens if the fluctuations of profit partly depend (as, indeed, they clearly do) on the fluctuations of investments ? 
Professor Tinbergen mentions the difficulty in a general way in a footnote .., where he says .. that <one has to be 
careful>. But is he ? .. In practice Professor Tinbergen seems to be entirely indifferent whether or not his basic factors 
are independent of one another” (ibid. p. 309-10 ). 
 
Then Keynes brought up two questions of technical importance: they concern the functional forms, 
the time lags and trends. First Keynes maintained the implausibility of the widespread assumption 
of linearity and argued for the examination of alternative functional forms. About time-lags and 
trend and the general problem of dynamic specification, Keynes expressed some perplexities and  
accused Tinbergen of  scarce rigour in treating time lags and trends in an ad hoc manner by 
choosing them by a trial and error approach: 
 
"Professor Tinbergen ... invents them [time lags] for himself. This he seems to do by some sort of trial-and-error 
method. That is to say, he fidgets about until he finds a time lag which does not fit in too badly with the theory he is 
testing and with the general presuppositions of his method …The introduction of a trend factor is even more tricky and 
even less discussed .. In the case of fluctuations in investment, 'trends', Professor Tinbergen explains, 'have been 
calculated as nine-year moving averages for pre-war periods … and as rectilinear trends for post-war periods " (ibid., p. 
315). 
 
This seemed to Keynes inaccurate and arbitrary:  
 
“with a free hand to choose coefficients and time lag, one can .. always cooking a formula to fit moderately well a 
limited range of past facts. But what does this prove ?” (letter to Tyler, cit. in Keynes 1973b, p. 286-7).  
 
In other terms, Keynes questioned the manipulation of data to “make possible to fit an explanation 
to any fact” (Keynes 1939, p. 311). 
In conclusion, he went back to what he considered the critical condition: the likely structural 
instability.  In 1938 Keynes put the constancy of the parameters into question: “the coefficients 
arrived at are apparently assumed to be constant for 10 years or for a larger period. Yet, surely we 
know that they are not constant" (Keynes 1973b, p.286). This issue is directly connected with the 
problem of the inductive generalisation, that is, the inductive and predictive value of the estimates, 
or the relevance of the estimated model to the future. It is “the slippery problem of passing from 
statistical description to inductive generalisation”, which, Keynes remembered, “thirty years ago [in 
the Treatise on Probability] I used to be occupied in examining in the case of simple correlation”:    13
 
"How far are these curves and equations meant to be no more than a piece of historical curve-fitting and description, 
and how far do they make inductive claims with reference to the future as well as the past ?   ... Put broadly, the most 
important condition is that the environment in all relevant respects .. should be uniform and homogeneous over a period 
of time. We cannot be sure that such conditions will persist in the future, even if we find them in the past. But if we find 
them in the past, we have at any rate some basis for an inductive argument” (Keynes 1939, p. 315-6 ) 
 
Tinbergen “makes the least possible preparation for the inductive transition” (p. 316). According to 
Keynes the correct procedure is to break up the period under examination into a series of sub-
periods, “with a view to discovering whether the results of applying our method to the various sub-
periods taken separately are reasonably uniform” (p. 316)
12. If this is the case, then there is some 
grounds for projecting the results into the future”.  This procedure was not followed by Tinbergen:  
 
“For his pre-war investigations he takes a period of about forty years and makes no attempt to break it up into sub-
periods. If he had done so, would his regression coefficients, calculated for each decade taken separately, differ 
somewhat widely from those calculated as the best fit for the whole period ? This is worth examination. For the main 
prima facie objection to the application of the method of multiple correlation to complex economic problems lies in the 
apparent lack of any adequate degree of uniformity in the environment” (ibid. p. 316-7). 
 
The chief dilemma Tinbergen was facing was, Keynes concluded,  “that the method requires not too 
short a series, whereas it is only in a short series, in most cases, that there is a reasonable 
expectation that the coefficients will be fairly constant” (Keynes 1973b, p. 294): this is, and will be, 
the leitmotif of Keynes’s criticism. Actually:  
 
“the broad problem of the credit cycle is just about the worst case to select to which to apply the method, owing to its 
complexity, its variability, and the fact [that] there are such important influences which cannot be reduced to statistical 
form” (ibid., emphasis added) 
 
This does not mean, Keynes added, that “there may not be problems within the general field of the 
trade cycle which would provide suitable material”.  However, “surely there is no general 
                                                 
12The genesis of this procedure is in the Treatise on Probability (1921). The criticism of the application of mathematical 
methods to the statistical inference leads Keynes to propose other methods “more consonant with the principle of sound 
induction”. In fact to argue from the mere fact that a given event has occurred invariably in a great number of instances 
that it is likely to occur invariably in future instances  “is a feeble inductive argument, because it takes no account of the 
analogy” (ibid., p. 445).  To strengthen the argument we need to increase the analogy between the instances. This 
“chiefly consists, Keynes argues, in determining whether the alleged association is stable, where the accompanying 
conditions are varied” (ibid., p. 427). A technical method that supplies the qualified procedure is, according to Keynes, 
that proposed by the German statistician and economist William Lexis. It consists in breaking up a statistical series into 
a number of sub-series, “with a view to analysing and measuring, not merely the frequency of a given character over the 
aggregate series, but the stability of this frequency amongst the sub-series” (p. 428, emphasis added).  
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presumption that any enquiry one might fix on will be suitable. The presumption is to the contrary”. 
According to Keynes “the method will prove valuable when applied to certain types of problems, 
[more elementary cases (Keynes 1939, p. 317)] where adequate statistics exist” (ibid.). In his 1939 
correspondence Keynes cites in fact at least two examples of types of problems to which multiple 
correlation methods can be reasonably applied (the demand for automobiles, and the demand for 
investment in new rolling stock. See section 4.3). 
  
  3.2.3. Tinbergen’s reply   
 
For Keynes the core of the matter were the logical conditions for applying the method of multiple 
correlation -- that is, an issue that precedes its application, while and the technical problems were 
subordinate to this logical question. Tinbergen’s reply, instead, avoided as much as possible the 
logical question and the “slippery problem of passing from statistical description to inductive 
generalisation”, and stressed – with many illustrations of his approach in business cycle research - 
the flexibility of his empirical method, leaving Keynes’s central objection substantially unanswered. 
As we know, Tinbergen was truly astonished at Keynes’s reaction and politely rejected it. On 
September 12, 1938, , after reading the critical notes Keynes sent to Tyler, Tinbergen wrote to him. 
He thought that there was  “some misunderstanding behind some of [Keynes’] questions”, but 
recognised that “it is difficult to meet [Keynes’] remarks on methodology in general” (Keynes 
1973b, pp. 291-3). He said that he preferred to discuss technical questions.  However, Tinbergen did 
not offer any systematic technical methodology for dealing with the problems under discussion, 
although he seemed to anticipate some contemporary advances (see Dharmapala-Mc Aleer 1996 
and Mc Aleer 1994). 
Regarding the need for  a complete list of the relevant factors –which was equivalent to say that the 
model must be correctly specified -, Tinbergen explained that he assumed that “the factors included 
are comprehensive as far as the more important are concerned" (emphasis added). He added that “it 
does not matter if non-relevant factors have been forgotten”, because “what factors are relevant and 
what are not will not always be cleared beforehand. It must then be tried out” (Tinbergen 1940a, p. 
142). In other words, he maintained that a correct specification is subjected to statistical testing. 
What is important, according to Tinbergen, is that some conditions (drastic restrictions, as a matter 
of fact) are met:   (a) that the explanatory variables chosen explicitly are the relevant ones; (b) that 
the non-relevant explanatory variables may be treated as random residuals, not systematically 
correlated with the other explanatory variables (“this may be tested afterwards - e.g. by calculating   15
the serial correlation for the residuals and the bunch maps”) -  and (c) that the mathematical form of 
the relation is given" (ibid., p. 141). 
As regards expectations and the state of confidence, Tinbergen thought  expectations are “products 
of the human mind which are based on past experience, even though they relate to future moments” 
(ibid., p. 147). They are “hidden” in some systematic variables such as profits, etc. He did not deny 
that “external events” may also influence expectations. However, he thought that “these external  
events will be, as a rule, of an unsystematic character, and may thus be part of unexplained 
residuals” (ibid.).    
As for the question whether the explanatory variables should be independent  of each other, 
Tinbergen distinguished between the statistical and the economic meaning of the word independent. 
He argued that, for statistical purposes, explanatory factors did not need to be economically 
independent of each other but only uncorrelated. 
As regards the question of the constancy of the coefficients, he explained that he assumed the 
constancy of coefficients as a first approximation. As to lags and trends, he admitted that “they are 
sometimes assumed by common sense guessing” and that   
 
“In principles both [lags and regression coefficients] have been determined so as to make the correlation the highest 
possible and by only admitting such values as seemed to have economic sense”  (ibid. p. 150). 
 
As regards Keynes’s observation that it was arbitrary to use nine-year moving averages as trends in 
pre-war periods and straight lines in post-war years, and that a manipulation makes it possible to fit 
any explanation to any facts, Tinbergen answered that there were arguments in favour of examining 
linear models: 
 
“for short periods there is not much difference between a straight trend and a moving average. For long periods there is, 
and then the moving average is decidedly better .. The advantage of straight-line trends is that no observations are lost 
in the extremes. This is why they have been preferred for the (short) post war-period”  (ibid. p. 251) 
 
About the crucial question of the inductive generalisation, Tinbergen maintained that:   
 
“If there is no reason to suppose that the laws that have governed  the reactions of individuals and firms in the past will 
have changed in the near future, it seems possible  to reach conclusions for the near future  by measuring as exactly as 
possible  those same reactions in the past”  (ibid. p. 152) 
   16
Of course, he added,  “this is only true if no structural changes take place”. However, he concluded, 
“even if [structural changes] take place, it will, in many cases, be possible to 'localise' their 
influence - i.e., to indicate which of the elementary or direct causal relations they affect” (ibid.).  
On the whole, Tinbergen rejected Keynes’s pessimistic view not because he considered his criticism 
irrelevant, but because in his opinion “the method under discussion promises much more than Mr. 
Keynes thinks”. “The proof of the pudding is in the eating”, he concluded. He was mainly interested 
in getting on with the job. 
 
3.2.4. An appendix to the debate: Rothbarth’s  review of Tinbergen’s second volume 
 
A review of the second volume of Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories, entitled Business 
Cycles in the United States of America, 1919-32, was published in the June-September 1941 issue 
of the Economic Journal., which was defined by Kalecki “a model of careful econometric analysis” 
(Kalecki 1944-5, p. 121). The author was Erwin Rothbarth, a twenty-eight old German economists 
who after emigrating to England taught economic statistics in Cambridge and worked very closely 
with Keynes (Cuyvers 1983). 
In November 1938 Rothbarth had already reviewed Tinbergen’s An Econometric Approach to 
Business Cycle Problems. There he acknowledged the “unassailable” case for the econometric 
method, but expressed caution as regards how far the econometric approach can go.  
Rothbarth praised Volume two of Tinbergen’s study as a “brilliant pioneering effort”. Before 
discussing Tinbergen’s results, Rothbarh highlighted the relevance of his attempt to demonstrate 
that a mathematical model of the trade cycle can be constructed which is both sufficiently simple to 
be tested statistically and a sufficiently good approximation to reality to be useful. Such relevance, 
Rothbarth wrote, is “independent of the question whether Professor Tinbergen succeeds in 
explaining the trade cycle in the U.S.A. In my view he fails, but his failure is almost insignificant 
beside the great merit of the attempt” (Rothbarth 1941, p. 294).  
Rothbarth then analysed Tinbergen’s findings with painstaking accuracy, questioning in a few cases 
Tinbergen’s reading of his own results. For instance, he pointed out how the econometric findings 
in themselves do not allow us to decide between two alternative interpretations of the influence of 
profits on consumption (either through speculative gains or through the increase demand for 
durables and semi-durables - the acceleration principle). He regarded other results, such as the 
negligible role of short term interest rate in determining investment in stocks, as not “finally 
conclusive” in the light of the poor statistics available and behaviours that might not be constant in 
time (such as the unwillingness to hold speculative stocks in slumps). As regards the treatment of 
long term interest rates, he highlighted, in a Keynesian line of reasoning, the potential importance of   17
immeasurable factors: “it is quite possible that variations in confidence and qualitative credit 
conditions were more important during this period that variations in pure interest rate” (ibid., p. 
295). In considering whether the model can account for longer cycles, Rothbarth revealed 
quantitative-oriented mind by taking into account the possible effect sampling errors. Finally, he 
also raised the issue of collinearity and the problem of the degrees of freedom, neglected by 
Tinbergen. 
Rothbarth concluded with a recommendation to “professor Tinbergen and his adherents” in favour 
of smaller models. Such suggestion is very much in the same line of reasoning as Keynes’s 
methodological considerations, as constructing smaller models implies more weight given to 
economic theory and the investigation of the economic material previous to manipulation of data. 
The very last paragraph of the review bring us back once again to one of Keynes’s main 
perplexities, the issue of non-homogeneity over time: 
 
“[With a smaller model, Tinbergen] would have needed a separate model for the 1919-22 cycle; but I cannot help 
feeling that this would have been an additional advantage rather than the reverse. It would have focussed the reader’s 
and Professor Tinbergen’s attention on the strong differences existing between this cycle and both the 1929 and 1937 
cycles” (ibid., p. 297). 
 
 
4.  The econometricians and Keynes, 1939-1941 
 
The econometricians’ initial reactions to the debate consisted in careful considerations of the issues 
raised by Keynes, although mostly in defence of Tinbergen. Many reviews of Tinbergen’s League 
of Nations study explicitly refer to Keynes’s criticism
13. Keynes’s attack also prompted some 
attempts by eminent econometricians to reconcile his criticism with statistical-econometrical work. 
 The examples of such attempts presented below appear to be particularly interesting as Keynes’s  
opinion on them was directly expressed in his correspondence between 1939 and 1941.  
The first case is the article by Jacob Marschak and Oskar Lange in defence of Tinbergen, submitted 
to the Economic Journal for publication but rejected by Keynes. The second one is an exchange of 
letters with Tjalling Koopmans over his 1941 paper “The Logic of Econometric Business-Cycle 
Research”, where he provided a clear restatement of Tinbergen’s method. Finally we present two 
specific applications of multiple correlation analysis which Keynes recognised as suitable: the study 
                                                 
13 Allen (1940) considered Keynes’s questions “pertinent”. Tintner (1941) agreed with Keynes that expectations “are 
not introduced explicitly enough” in the study (p. 622). J.E.W. (the reviewer for the Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society) (1940), raised some of Keynes’s methodological questions (albeit without quoting him) on factors 
measurability, the constancy of coefficients, the linearity, etc.   18
of automobile demand (correspondence with Victor Szeliski of the Institute of Applied 
Econometrics, New York
14) and the demand of investment in new rolling stock (analysed by E.J. 
Broster). 
  
4.1.  In defence of Tinbergen: Lange and Marshack, 1940  
 
Shortly after publishing Tinbergen’s rejoinder, Keynes received a journal submission from Oskar 
Lange and Jacob Marschak entitled “Mr. Keynes on the statistical verification of business cycle 
theories”.
15 (It was sent from Chicago, 15 February 1940, immediately before Tinbergen’s reply and 
Keynes’s final comment were published). Keynes decided not to publish the paper in the Economic 
Journal. It was then published for the first time in Hendry and Morgan eds. (1995), where it is 
presented as an example of the “more constructive criticism that emanated from those in favour of 
Tinbergen’s approach, who saw problems with it but wished to advance the methods adopted” (p. 
56). Such assessment, in our opinion, overrates the paper. 
Lange and Marschak start by claiming themselves in “profound agreement with the economic 
theories of Mr Keynes”, and are therefore keen in supporting the idea they capable of empirical and 
statistical verification (p. 390). However, the case for statistical verifiability is not discussed in 
depth before moving on to the importance of giving quantitative precision to what is already known 
in qualitatively terms. Lange and Marschak agree on some of the weaknesses of Tinbergen’s work 
pointed out by Keynes, and even add a few to the list. They criticise Tinbergen’s treatment of 
regression coefficients as exact numbers, rather than as estimates, and his subsequent failure to 
compute standard errors
16. 
The rest of their essay is devoted mainly to remarks of a more technical nature, some of which are 
dealt with acutely, while on others the line of argument appears seriously flawed. The cobweb 
model is presented in order to show how cyclical movements can be generated by linear 
relationships. The issue of the measurability of variables is addressed by noting that many 
qualitative dimensions can be treated statistically (e.g. through the use of dummy variables). Far 
less convincing is the defence of the use of trends, which Lange and Marschak interpret as a mean 
                                                 
14 The Institute was founded in 1938 by Charles F. Roos, one of the founders of the Econometric Society in 1930 and 
the director of the Cowles Commission for Research in Economics from 1934 to 1937. In 1937 he left for New York to 
engage in the practical application of econometrics to the problems of business. Here he founded the Econometric 
Institute, of which he was the president and director of research from 1938 until his death in 1958. Victor S. Szeliski 
was co-author with Roos of many papers between 1934 and 1943, published in Econometrica, Journal of American 
Stastistical Association, Journal of Political Economy. 
15 From a history of economics point of view, the relevance of this paper lies also in the fact that it was written with the 
help of Trigve Haavelmo, Jacob Mosak and Theodore Yntema. 
16 However, Lange and Marshak seem inaccurate on this point: Tinbergen apparently did compute standard errors, as 
explained in the paragraph on “Significance calculations”
 for at least some of the regression equations. See table III.10, 
p. 78-79, and Graph III.12, p.84.   19
both of capturing the gradual variation in time of parameters and of eliminating the “nonsense 
correlations” arising in time series. 
On the whole, the tone of the article was overall conciliatory, but the defence of the method appears 
weak and unaware of the deep methodological issues. Hendry and Morgan hypothesise that Keynes 
decided not to publish it because he thought that the issue had already been discussed enough. In a 
letter to Harrod of August 27, 1935, Keynes expressed his worries about the tendency to accept part 
of his work by accommodating it to views that were incompatible with it. In this light it certainly 
seems legitimate to conjecture that Keynes was likely to be irritated by the real eagerness expressed 
by the authors to reconcile his theories with the methods of empirical verification. In any case, in 
our opinion Keynes’s decision appears justified by the analysis of the contents of the article, which 
add little substance to the debate. Actually, in a letter sent to Pigou on 29 March 1940 (EJ/1/6), 
Keynes maintained that Tinbergen’s reply was of far higher quality as Lange and Marschak  “tell us 
what their view is but do not give their reasons”. He confirmed that he criticised Tinbergen’s 
method and not the idea that business cycle theories can be tested
17: 
 
“I have, of course, never said anything to the effect that no business cycle theory can be tested statistically. I was 
dealing solely with Tinbergen’s very special method of analysis”.  
  
4.2.  In defence of Tinbergen:  Koopmans, 1941    
 
A deeper and more complete consideration of Keynes’s criticism is provided one year later by 
Tjalling Koopmans’s article “The logic of econometric business cycle research” (Koopmans 1941).  
On May 23, 1941, Keynes received a letter from Koopmans, announcing that he was sending him 
an offprint of said article, which attempted “to answer some of the questions raised in your review 
of Tinbergen’s investigation for the League of Nations” (CO/4/155). In fact, it was intended as a 
contribution to a more systematic exposition of the logic of methods applied in econometric 
business-cycle research. 
The article aims to address the issue “to what extent business cycle econometric results derive from 
statistical observation and to what extent they depend on other hypothesis or information?” (p. 158). 
Koopmans starts off by enumerating “the elements of the logical situation facing the student of that 
problem” (ibid.). The first one is the availability of time series data. He noted how from “the 
                                                 
17 O’Donnell’s comment (1997) to this letter is analogous: “The letter .. demonstrates .. two important propositions. The 
first is that Keynes’s critique of Tinbergen’s work was only a critique of a ‘very special method of analysis’. Although 
this proposition may be inferred from Keynes’s previously published writings, it is unambiguously confirmed by the 
letter… The second is that the object of his attack was not the validity of all conceivable statistical methods, including 
those for statistically testing the business cycle … Both propositions are also abundantly clear in Keynes’ reply to 
Lange” (p. 155-6).   20
combination of uniqueness and manifold interrelation of data” (which are two crucial characteristics 
of economic data) some “fundamental difficulties and limitations” arise that are specific to the 
application of these methods to economic problems (p. 160). 
The second element is the adoption of the “general working hypothesis”: that causal connections 
between the variables dominate “mere chance fluctuations” in determining the fluctuations of the 
internal variables (apart from “recognised but unmeasurable external factors” such as earthquakes 
or strikes)
18. Koopmans  recognised the possibility of unmeasurable internal factors acting as a 
cause on other variables, thus addressing one of Keynes’s more important questions. He maintained 
that the only way to make sense of this concept is if non-measurable phenomena like “expectations” 
or the “state of confidence” are regarded as themselves determined mainly by measurable internal 
and/or recognizable external phenomena. 
The need for introducing additional information
19 – the third element – stems from the fact that the 
high degree of interrelation allows for different ways in which fluctuations of one variable may be 
reconstructed by combining some others. In the absence of additional information, the only 
unconditional inference one may draw is negative (that is to say, proving a theory incorrect) and 
inconclusive. 
Koopmans then discussed the relevant features of Tinbergen’s investigations, identifying three sets 
of premises in his study: 
1) that all influence on variable x1 (dependent) not emanating from a set of “determining” variables 
x2,…,xn is attributable either to influences adding up to a random component, or to an function of 
time (trend), or stem from recognised un-measurable external forces affecting only a few 
observations; 
2) that the influence exercised by x2,…,xn can be represented by mathematical functions; 
3) assumptions on the sign or value range or on the relative proportions of coefficients, and on value 
range for lags. 
The method prescribes that the list of premises is produced by the economist and then passed on to 
the mathematical statistician who first applies the principle of statistical censorship, which requires 
that “the additional information should not imply statements which can be unconditionally rejected 
because they are contradicted by the data” (p. 163). He will then investigate “whether at least one 
set of coefficients and lags exists which is compatible with all three set of premises”
20. Koopmans 
                                                 
18 Internal/external correspond to endogeneous/exogeneous in today terms. 
19 This may take the form of observations not expressible as statistical time series, experiences from other countries or 
periods of time, deductions from economic theory or “mere working hypothesis with a certain degree of plausibility”. 
20 .i.e., that: “(i) has the properties specified in the third set of premises and (ii) when combined with the series x2,…,xn 
… (according to the prescriptions given in the second set of premises) leaves only such ‘unexplained residuals’ … as do 
not contradict the premises adopted in the first set.” (p. 166).   21
seems to accept some of Keynes’s concerns in highlighting the crucial centrality of economic 
premises: 
 
“Knowing how easily a statistically undetectable omission of one relevant determining variable, or an incorrect 
specification of an a priori known lag, may … distort the values and even the signs of the other coefficients, the 
investigator will devote a full share of his suspicion to the less technical part of the procedure: the choice of the 
premises.” (p. 167, emphasis added). 
 
If the statistician finds a good fit, this does not confirm that the list of premises is valid, but merely 
suggests the conditional conclusion that takes the form of “best estimates”. The validity of these 
estimates needs to be assessed against the width of margins of error and problems such as the 
presence of multiple collinearity. After the statistician’s verdict on the premises as a whole (they 
may be contradicted by the data, or not; if not, they might provide sufficient basis for quantitative 
precision, or not), it is again the economist’s task to divide premises into acceptable and dubitable 
ones. It can then be the case that the statistician is able to confirm the dubitable premise.  
Koopmans stressed the importance of expressing the alternative to a dubitable premise in terms of a 
subsidiary premise such that it is mutually exclusive to the dubitable one and that either one or the 
other could be true. He then choose to illustrate this by discussing the two premises that Keynes 
found most problematic: the use of linear relations and the constancy of coefficients. In order to test 
the linearity assumption, Koopmans suggested technical devices such as including in the equation 
the squares or other curvilinear functions of the explanatory variables as a conclusive test that 
Tinbergen failed to perform. Matters are far more complicated in reference to the constancy of the 
coefficients: “Here I appeal to economists to specify the criticism in order to make its relevance 
liable to statistical test” (p. 175). In some cases “abrupt change at specific moment in time” might 
be identified, while in order to allow for “gradual and smooth change” (p. 175), if a sufficient 
number of observations is available, one may break up the period in two or more sub-periods. A 
different case arises when the influence of a determinant variable x2 on x1 depends on the value of 
x3 (due to bottlenecks in the economy or to unmeasurable factors), with the result that the additivity 
of influences should be abandoned. He admitted having no suggestions as to how to test for 
constancy of lags: “Purely technical study is urgently required on this important point” (p. 177). 
Koopmans’s conclusion was that: 
 
“No single clear-cut answer can be given to our initial question… [the combination of data and additional information] 
is a complicated process, the result of a continuous dialogue of a game of give and take, between economist and 
statistician.” (p. 178)   22
  
While he looked at Tinbergen’s results in the light of his rigorous description of the method, he 
nevertheless basically defended and reaffirmed the validity of the method itself, regarded as: 
 
“the only method by which the relevant information contained in statistical time series can be extracted and made 
available for giving such quantitative precision to the supposed relationships of business-cycle theory as it truly 
supports.” (ibid.) 
 
He maintained that in the cases where “a basis of premises both solid and sufficient has been 
reached with respect to each variable to be explained” (p. 179), extrapolations could be made from 
the knowledge gained for two kind of purposes: policy and prediction. As regards policy, the 
objective is to quantify the effect a certain measure would have within the studied period in the 
country analysed: using it as a guide to actual policy presupposes “the persistence of main dynamic 
features of the economy in the future” (ibid., emphasis added). Prediction represents a “much more 
hazardous undertaking” (ibid.). 
Koopmans’s conclusion was that Tinbergen’s results fall instead under the cases where “a basis 
both solid and sufficient … could not be established” (p. 180). A number of unsolved 
uncertainties
21 allow thus “not one single reconstruction of the fluctuations of the period but a set of 
possible explanations” (ibid.). Koopmans reveals his strongly policy-motivated concern in defining 
“the important mathematical problem”: “to detect and analyse common characteristics of all 
possible explanations and to discover whether certain types of policy may have favourable effects 
on stability whichever explanations corresponds best to reality” (ibid.). 
On May 29
th, 1941, Keynes answered Koopmans, He expressed great appreciation for his work, but 
also reaffirmed his fundamental criticism, emphasising as the main dilemma the issue of stability of 
the environment in the long run: 
 
“Many thanks for sending me your article … I enjoyed it very much. I am sure these matters need discussing in that 
sort of way. There is one point, to which in practice I attach a great importance, you do not allude to. In many of these 
statistical researches, in order to get enough observations they have to be scattered over a lengthy period of time; and 
for a lengthy period of time it very seldom remains true that the environment is sufficiently stable. That is the dilemma 
of many of these enquiries, which they do not seem to me to face. Either they are dependent on too few observations, or 
they cannot rely on the stability of the environment. It is only rarely that this dilemma can be avoided” (CO/4/170, 
emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
21 He explicitly mentioned the “relative influence of retail prices and income on consumption expenditure” and referred 
to other influences whose recognition is limited by the lack of calculation margins of error.   23
4.3.    Two examples of the method ‘properly in place’: the correspondence with Broster 
and  Szeliski , 1939 
 
Keynes’s correspondence in the years of the debate also offers examples of applied studies in which 
he believed that the use of econometric tools was justified by the specific features of the object of 
analysis. 
One example is cited in his letter to Tyler of 23 August 1938: the case of the demand for investment 
in new rolling stock.
  At that time Keynes was publishing in the Economic Journal an article by the 
English statistician E. J. Broster that applied the multiple-correlation method to the question of the 
relation between the volume of traffic and operating costs on the British Railways in the years 
1928-1937 (Broster 1938). He introduced multiple linear regression equations expressing total 
operating costs as a function of passenger-miles, ton-miles and coaching train-miles, and freight-
train-miles: “That is the sort of case – Keynes remarked - where one has at any rate a modest 
expectation of useful results”.
  He continued:  
 
“On the other hand, the question of what determines the volume of investment itself I should regard prima facie 
extremely unpromising material for the method” (Keynes 1973b, p. 295).  
 
In his correspondence with him Keynes agreed with the methodological line taken by Broster, 
however adding: 
 
“I was raising  the logical difficulties. You say in effect that, if one was to take these seriously, one would give up the 
ghost in the first lap, but that the method, used judiciously as an aid to more theoretical enquiries and as a means of 
suggesting possibilities and probabilities rather than anything else, taken with  enough grains of salt and applied with 
superlative common sense, won’t do much harm. I should quite agree with that. That is how the method ought to be 
used. Though, even so, I think it requires more careful selection of topics than Tinbergen has made. He, however, is 
really claiming much more of it, - as though it was of more demonstrative character than other methods of approach” 
(letter to E.J. Broster, December 19, 1939, CO/11/447, emphasis added) 
 
The second case is illustrated by an exchange with Victor Szeliski, from whom Keynes received a 
letter in November 1939. Szeliski had read Keynes’s review of Tinbergen’s League of Nations 
study “with considerable interest and approval”, and he ‘naturally’ wondered to what extent Keynes 
thought that “the same criticisms apply to Roos’s and my study of automobile demand”. He added:  
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“Of course our purpose was narrower that his; we were not trying to prove or disprove business cycle hypotheses, but to 
develop a “law” connecting retail automobile sales with factors which, a priori, are causes of sales”(CO/11/444)
22.  
 
Their study, part of a research project commissioned by General Motors, investigated the 
determinants of demand for automobiles and, among other things, estimated its price-elasticity. It 
was critically reviewed by Willford I. King, president of the American Statistical Society (King 
1939a). King raised questions on the suitability of the data series used, on the neglect of the effects 
of the movement of the supply curve, and on the identification problem - how the shape of one 
curve can be reconstructed from data on the intersections of demand and supply. King expressed a 
general distrust in inductive methods. 
Roos’s and Szeliski’s reply (1939b) begins with a reflection on the need for a shift to take place in 
economics towards defining concepts “not in terms of properties, but in terms of the series of 
operations by which they are measured” an in the physical sciences (p. 652). They praised the 
development of econometric methods as a step in such direction (making the deductive process more 
rigorous), but they deplored the excessive attention devoted in this field to mathematical 
technicalities and counted Keynes (together with Evans, Fisher, Schultz, and Robertson) among the few 
who explored the underlying theoretical premises upon which econometric investigation should 
rely. 
They reject King’s point of view, which they take as representative of the classical and neoclassical 
tradition, and argue for general demand functions including many arguments (such as prices of 
other goods and time) from which the classical (Cournot-Marshall) demand function D=F(p) is 
derived as a special case (by holding other things, including time, constant). As for the 
identification problem they wrote correctly: “unless the supply curve shifts, it is impossible to 
determine the demand curve at all”. 
In his rejoinder Kings (1939b) expressed a clear a priori anti-econometrics position:  
 
“I consider that statistical and mathematical processes can, by themselves, but rarely be relied upon to establish 
economic laws or relationships, and that when findings are based purely upon the results of such procedures they are 
even more likely to be invalid than when they are based solely upon deductions drawn form everyday observations… in 
the economic field, statistics and mathematics are mainly useful for verifying and reducing to quantitative terms 
concepts which have first been worked out thoroughly by a process of deduction from facts commonly observed. [Roos 
and von Szeliski], on the other hand, believe in relying almost entirely upon the inductive method” (p. 664) 
 
                                                 
22 The reference was to: Roos C.F. and V. von Szeliski, The Dynamic of Automotive Demand, published by General 
Motors Corporation in 1939, and “The concept of demand and price elasticity. The dynamics of automobile demand”, 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 34, 1939, pp. 652-664.      25
In a further reply Roos and Szeliski (1939c) reaffirmed their methodological standpoint, and the 
need for statistical analysis in demand studies: 
 
“The issue here is above all how the method of analysis can be related to the theoretical background or what kind of 
techniques are required by the theoretical background. […]We do not rely almost entirely on induction and[…]we 
regard every-day observations pertaining to the industry as of utmost importance.” (p. 665) 
 
Keynes’s reply to Szeliski of December 19, 1939 provides a restatement his views on the proper 
role for econometric methods and thus supports our view that Keynes is not an a priori anti-
econometrician.   
 
 "In reply to your letter of November 1921, it is now some time since I looked through your study of automobile 
demand, and only a general impression is left in my mind. This general impression, however, is to the effect that you 
have chosen just the sort of problem where multiple correlation methods may be useful. You are dealing with details of 
a specific problem where the main causes are pretty well known a priori, and where the statistics are definite and 
precise. The method is always full of danger, but, in my opinion, it is the kind of problem to which you have applied it 




5. Concluding remarks 
 
Keynes is not a critic and an opponent  of econometric work per se. Our reconstruction shows that 
there is no evidence for this interpretation. What he opposed were the attempts at statistical 
inference without any prior effort of ascertaining the suitability of the economic material for making 
such inferences. At the core of Keynes’s criticism of Tinbergen’s work there is the question of 
methodology.  He disputed the legitimacy of inductive methods in the form of correlation analysis 
applied to economic matters.  He argued that there was no reason to expect the behaviours were 
stable over the long run, and so there was no reason to infer stable correlations.  Keynes’s stance in 
relation to Tinbergen is fundamentally similar to the one adopted in his Treatise on Probability. 
“The slippery problem” of passing from statistical description to inductive generalisation, which 
Keynes had shown nineteen years earlier to be relevant for the case of simple correlation, [prima 
facie] seemed to him to arise also for the multiple correlation method.. Keynes focused upon the 
inductive aspects of Tinbergen's analysis and examined  whether the implicit 'fundamental 
assumptions' he made - uniformity and homogeneity of the environment over a period of time, 
completeness of the list of the significant causes, measurability of all the significant factors, mutual   26
independence of factors - were legitimate. Only if the conditions for inductive generalisation are 
met does it become possible to use the method of multiple correlation for disentangling the laws of  
action of the forces at the work. In  Keynes’s opinion “every one of these conditions is far from 
being satisfied” (p. 286) in the field of business cycle:     
 
“The successful application of this method to so enormously complex a problem as the business cycle does strike me as 
singularly unpromising project in the present state of our knowledge” (emphasis added).  
 
Econometricians at first took Keynes’s criticism in earnest. The debate went on at least until 
Koopmans (1941), but came to a rupture , when Haavelmo (1943) wholly restated econometric 
methods in probabilistic terms. Haavelmo began his “Statistical Testing of Business Cycle 
Theories” by remarking that the criticisms directed at Tinbergen’s study went beyond technical 
matters but often implied instead that Tinbergen “had tried to go too far with statistical 
methods”(ibid.). Keynes is explicitly (and incorrectly) identified as a believer in the supremacy of 
“the noble art of theoretical deductions based on ‘general economic considerations’”. Rather than 
focussing on the more technical issues, and discussing them one by one, Haavelmo cut the ground 
beneath them by a change of paradigm that makes them irrelevant. 
The first key point is that any model is seen as a formal logical construction, such that a non-logical 
jump is always needed in the end: however complex the formal construction is, “we shall not, by 
logical operations alone, be able to build a complete bridge between our model and reality”. Actual 
data series are to be somehow arbitrarily chosen as counterparts of theoretical variables, and a 
statement deduced for the latter is made about the former. Verifying such a statement does not 
imply accepting the theory, though, as “the same statement might usually be deduced from many 
different constructions”. In this context, Haavelmo gets rid of the worry about the completeness of 
the list of causes: a regression equation containing an incomplete list of causes “means only the 
testing of a somewhat simpler hypothesis” and is likely to produce “an addition to our knowledge”. 
Haavelmo’s second key point is that  both theoretical and observed variables should be redefined as 
stochastic objects. He claims that this is necessary for “an objective and  intelligent discussion of 
such questions as those of Lord Keynes.” The objective of statistical testing becomes “to draw some 
inference […] as to which of these mechanisms (probability laws) actually produced the data” 
(p.17). In order to be tested, a business cycle theory must then take the form of hypotheses 
regarding joint probability laws and allowing for probability statements about facts, which leave 
room for type I and type II errors:  
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“We now have the possibility that the theory might be true even when the deduced statement about the facts turn out to 
be wrong. Also, the  theory might  be wrong […] while the statement it makes about the facts might sometimes be true” 
(ibid)  
 
In fact, it is accepted theories are undistinguishable from the point of view of observations and that 
such problem cannot be eliminable: “Theories with different economic meaning might lead to 
exactly the same probability law… just as different pairs of supply and demand curves might have 
the same intersection point.” [italics in the original] (p. 18) 
Haavelmo provided the basis for much of the methodology of the Cowles Commission. With the 
establishment of this approach, Keynes-type discussions were increasingly ignored and the slippery 
issue of causal inference was kept in the econometric closet for over thirty years (see Leamer 1983).  
Today, however, econometricians recognize that most of the problems Keynes raised were real and 
his warnings on the specific question of business cycle are still relevant, even if econometrics has 
made considerable efforts to overcome the difficulties. It is also the general opinion that Keynes’s 
criticism seems to be overly harsh within the context of contemporary econometrics of 1939-40. 
  What motivated such harshness? The answer does not lie in Keynes’s temperamental 
characteristics, as suggested by Stone (1978). Rather, on the fact that from the mid-1930s on 
Keynes had noticed that a new anti-Marshallian conception on the nature, method and style of 
economics − opposed to what he considered correct − was meeting with increasing success (see 
Marchionatti 2002 and 2004). What’s more, this new approach was appropriating his own work. 
Keynes was seriously worried about the emerging tendency to use statistical and mathematical 
methods to formalise economic analysis. This “large proportion of recent mathematical 
economics… assumes strict independence between the factors involved and lose all their cogency 
and authority if this hypothesis is disallowed”, he wrote in the General Theory (Keynes 1936, p. 
297). On this basis, his judgement was strongly negative:  
 
“Too large a proportion of recent mathematical economics are merely concoctions, as imprecise as the initial 
assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real 
world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols” (ibid., p. 296)   
 
By “recent mathematical economics,” Keynes was referring to those economists who subscribed to 
the Econometric Society program. This can be asserted on the basis of the little explicit evidence 
available –  his correspondence with Harrod and, above all, with Ragnar Frisch in the 1930s
23. The 
Econometric Society was founded in 1930. Its program – set out in the editorial of Econometrica by 
                                                 
23 The correspondence with Ragnar Frisch is concentrated in the period 1932-1936. A discussion of it is in  Louçã 1999.    28
Ragnar Frisch – was “to promote studies that aim at a unification of the theoretical-quantitative and 
the empirical-quantitative approach to economic problems” and “that are penetrated by constructive 
and rigorous thinking similar to that which has come to dominate in the natural sciences” (Frisch 
1933, p. 1). As emerges from his correspondence with Frisch, Keynes’s mistrust in “recent 
mathematical economics” concerned:  
a)  the imprecision of assumptions, which are often ‘special’, but covered by a maze of 
symbolism; for example, the assumption of strict independence between the factors (often 
present in mathematical works), excludes the consideration of complexity;  
b)  b) the un-clear application of conclusions.    
Keynes’s concern was due to the fact that his own ideas – from the Treatise on Money to the 
General Theory –were having a relevant impact on young econometricians.
24 Many of them, such 
as Frisch and Tinbergen, thought that an important goal of economics was to create a basis for 
practical measures to be implemented in order to fight economic crisis and unemployment. 
Keynes’s theoretical analysis in General Theory and his emphasis on monetary and fiscal policies 
made his work extremely important for the econometricians as a theoretical structure suitable for 
quantitative analysis of those problems. In this sense it met the early Keynesians who saw the 
General Theory as a “machine for policy” (Skidelsky 1992, p. 538). According to econometricians 
Keynes’s theory, originally expressed in literary form, had to be translated into mathematical form 
as a system of equations to emphasise the basis hypotheses in a formal and simpler framework. 
Immediately after its publication, Keynes’s Theory was discussed in Econometrica’s circle. The 
first version of Hicks’ paper, which contained the famous IS-LM model of Keynes’s theory, had 
been presented and discussed to the sixth European meeting of the Econometric Society at Oxford 
in September 1936 and published in Econometrica in April 1937, just after Harrod’s and Meade’s 
papers. After that, this simultaneous equation interpretation became its dominant interpretation – i.e. 
a simplified version of the General Theory in the form of a specified model that offered a 
mathematical framing for the theory -,  even though this was at odds with Keynes’s original 
formulation. The tendency to accept only a part of his work while rejecting the rest had already 
worried Keynes, when he was discussing various issues of the General Theory with Harrod:   
 
“I am frightfully afraid of the tendency of which I see signs in you [Harrod], to appear to accept my constructive part 
and to find some accommodation between this and deeply cherished views which would in fact be only possible if my 
constructive part had been partially misunderstood” (Keynes to Harrod, 27 August 1935, in Keynes 1973a, p.548).  
 
                                                 
24 Tinbergen himself, reviewing in 1935 the recent business cycle theories, devoted great attention to the parts of 
Keynes’s Treatise of Money “which give very pertinent remarks on the business cycle problems” (p. 266). Tinbergen 
classifies Keynes’s theory as a semi-mathematical one and argues for its mathematical treatment.   29
Keynes reacted against the dangers of encapsulating his theories in a limited formal model in his 
famous 1937 article on the Quarterly Journal of Economics. There he emphasised the importance of 
factors like uncertain knowledge, in presence of which ”there is no scientific basis on which to form 
any calculable probability whatever” (p. 113) and rational calculation is of little use. At that time 
Keynes probably became aware that a convergence was to be realised among what we can call the 
early ‘neoclassical synthesis’ interpretation of the General Theory and the interpretation given by 
the econometricians. Tinbergen epitomised this tendency at its best. On the one hand he 
reintroduced a conception of economics and its method that Keynes (as Marshall before him) had 
rejected, on the other hand he put forward a usage of statistical inference that Keynes had criticised.  





Allen, R.G.D. (1940), “Review of Statistical Testing of Business –Cycle Theories, Vol. I: A Method and Its Application 
to Investment Activity: Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories. Vol. II: Business Cycles in the United States of 
America, 1919-32”, Economica, 7, 335-339. 
Anonymous (J.E.W.) (1940), “Review of Statistical Testing of Business –Cycle Theories, Vol. I: A Method and Its 
Application to Investment Activity: Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories. Vol. II: Business Cycles in the United 
States of America, 1919-32”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 103, 256-259. 
Bateman, B. W. (1990), "Keynes, induction and econometrics", History of Political Economy, 22:2, 359-379. 
Broster, E.J. (1938), “Variability of Railway Operating Costs”, Economic Journal, 48 (192), December, pp. 674-684 
Carabelli, A. (1988), On Keynes’s Method, London: Macmillan. 
Cuyvers, L. (1983), “Keynes collaboration with Erwin Rothbarth”, The Economic Journal, 93, 629-36. 
Dharmapala, D. and McAleer, M. (1996), “Econometric Methodology and the Philosophy of Science”, Journal of 
Statistical Planning and Inference, 49, pp. 9-37. 
Epstein, R. (1987), A History of Econometric Ideas, Amsterdam: North Holland 
Frisch, R. (1933a), “Editorial”, Econometrica, 1, p. 1-4. 
Frisch, R. (1933b), "Propagation and Impulse Problems in Dynamic Economics", in Economic Essays in Honor of 
Gustav Cassel. 
Garrone, G. and Marchionatti, R. (2004), “Keynes on econometric method. A reassessment of his debate with 
Tinbergen and other econometricians, 1938-’43”, CESMEP Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of 
Torino.   
Haavelmo, T. (1943), "Statistical Testing of Business Cycle Theories", Review of Economics and Statistics, 25: 13-18. 
Hamouda, O.F. and Smithin, J.N. (eds), Keynes and Public Policy after Fifty Years, vol. 2, E.Elgar. 
Harrod, R. (1938), “Scope and Method in Economics”, Economic Journal, 48, September, pp. 303-412.  
Harrod, R. (2003), The Collected Interwar Papers and Correspondence of Roy Harrod, edited by D. Besomi, two vols. 
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Hendry, D.F. (1980), "Econometrics - Alchemy or Science ?", Economica, 47, August, 387-406.   30
Hendry, D.F. and Morgan, M.S. (1995) eds. The Foundations of Econometric analysis, Cambridge University Press. 
Hicks, J.R. (1937), “Mr. Keynes and the ‘Classics’: A suggested interpretation”, Econometrica, 5, pp. 147-159.  
Kalecki, M. (1944-5), “The Work of Erwin Rothbarth”, The Review of Economic Studies, 12 (2), pp. 121-2.  
Keuzenkamp, H. A.  (2000), Probability, Econometrics and Truth. The methodology of econometrics, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Keynes, J.M. (1921), The Treatise on Probability. Now in The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. VIII, London, 
Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1973. 
Keynes, J.M. (1926), “Francis Ysidro Edgeworth, 1845-1926”, The Economic Journal, March. Now in The Collected 
Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. X, Essays in Biography,, Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1973. 
Keynes, J.M. (1928), “Review of Frederick C. Mills, The Behaviour of prices. A report of an investigation”, The 
Economic Journal,  38, December. Now in The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. XI, Macmillan for the Royal 
Economic Society, 1973. 
Keynes, J.M. (1930), A Treatise on Money, Macmillan Press. Now in The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vols. V 
and VI, Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1971. 
Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London, Macmillan Press. Now  in The 
Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. VII, London, Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 1973. 
Keynes, J.M. (1937), “The General Theory of Employment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 51 (2), pp. 209-223. Now 
in The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. XIV. 
Keynes, J.M. (1939), “Professor Tinbergen’s Method”, Economic Journal, 49, pp. 558-568. Now in The Collected 
Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. XIV, The General Theory and After. Part II. Defence and Development, Macmillan for 
the Royal Economic Society, 1973. 
Keynes, J.M. (1940)  “Comment”, The Economic Journal, March.  Now in The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. 
XIV, The General Theory and After. Part II. Defence and Development, Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society, 
1973. 
Keynes, J.M. (1973a), The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. XIII, The General Theory and After. Part I. 
Preparation, Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society. 
Keynes, J.M. (1973b), The Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, vol. XIV, The General Theory and After. Part II. 
Defence and Development, Macmillan for the Royal Economic Society. 
King, W.I. (1939), “Can production of Automobiles be Stabilized by Making Their Prices Flexible?”, Journal of the 
ASA, December 1939, pp. 641-651. 
King, W.I. (1939b), “The concept of demand and price elasticity. The dynamics of automotive demand: A Rejoinder ”, 
Journal of the ASA, December 1939, pp. 664-5. 
Klant, J. (1989), “The Slippery Transition”, in T. Lawson and H. Pesaran (eds) Keynes’ Economics: Methodological 
Issues, London: Croom Helm. 
Klein, L. (1951), “The Life of J. M. Keynes”, Journal of Political Economy, 59, pp. 443-51. 
Koopmans, T.C. (1941), "The Logic of Econometric Business-Cycle Research', Journal of Political Economy, 49: 157-
181. 
Lawson, T and  Pesaran, H. (eds) (1985),  Keynes’ Economics: Methodological Issues, London: Croom Helm. 
Lawson, T. (1985), “Keynes, prediction and econometrics”, in T. Lawson and H. Pesaran (eds), cit. 
Lawson, T. (1989), “Realism and Instrumentalism in the Development of Econometrics”, in N. de Marchi and Gilbert 
(eds), History and Methodology of Econometrics, Oxford, Clarendon Press.   31
Leamer, E. (1983), “Let’s Take the Con Out of Econometrics”, American Economic Review, 73, pp. 31-43. 
Leeson, R. (1998), “The Ghosts I Called I Can’t Get Rid of Now: the Keynes-Tinbergen-Friedman-Phillips Critique of 
Keynesian Macroeconometrics”, History of Political Economy, 30(1), pp. 51-94. 
Louçã, F. (1999), “The econometric challenge to Keynes: arguments and contradictions in the early debate about a late 
issue”, The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 6, 404-438. 
Marchionatti, R. (1999), “On Keynes’s animal spirits”, Kyklos, 52: 415-39. 
Marchionatti, R. (2002), “Dealing with Complexity: Marshall and Keynes on the Nature of Economic Thinking”, in The 
Economics of Alfred Marshall. Revisiting Marshall’s Legacy, edited by R. Arena and M. Quéré, London: Palgrave-
Macmillan. 
Marchionatti, R. (2004), “What don’t economists know now that a century ago Marshall did ? A note on Marshall 
sophisticated informality”, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, Spring 2004, pp. 441-460. 
Marschak, J. and Lange, O. (1940), "Mr. Keynes on the Statistical Verification of Business Cycle Theories" in Hendry, 
D.F. and Morgan, M.S. (1995), cit. pp. 390-398. 
McAleer, M (1994), “Sherlock Holmes and the Search for Truth: A Diagnostic Tale”, Journal of Economic Survey, 8, 
pp. 317-70. 
Moggridge, D.E. (ed, Maynard Keynes: An Economist’s Biography, London, Routledge. 
Morgan, M.S. (1990), The History of Econometric Ideas, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
O’Donnell, R. (1997), “Keynes and Formalism”, in G.C. Harcourt and P.A. Riach, A ‘Second Edition’ of the General 
Theory, vol. 2, London: Routledge. 
Patinkin, D. (1976), “Keynes and econometrics: on the interaction between the macroeconomics revolutions in the 
interwar period”, Econometrica 44: 1091-1123. 
Pearson, K. (1897), “Mathematical contributions to the theory of evolution - On a form of spurious correlation which 
may arise when indices are used in the measurement of organs”. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 60, 489-
497. 
Pesaran, H. and Smith, R. (1985), “Keynes on Econometrics”, in T. Lawson and H. Pesaran (eds), cit.  
Roos, C.F and Szeliski, V. (1939), The Dynamic of Automotive Demand, General Motor Corporation. 
Roos, C.F. and Szeliski, V. (1939b), “The concept of demand and price elasticity. The dynamics of automotive 
demand”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 34, pp. 652-664 
Roos, C.F. and Szeliski, V. (1939c), “The concept of demand and price elasticity. The dynamics of automotive demand: 
A Further Reply”, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 34, pp. 665-6. 
Rothbarth, E. (1938), “An Econometric Approach to Business Cycle Problems”, Economica, 5 (20), pp. 488-91. 
Rothbarth, E. (1941), “ Review of Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories: II. Business Cycle in the United 
States of America, 1919-32”, Economic Journal, 51, 293-7. 
Rowley, R. (1988), “The Keynes-Tinbergen Exchange in Retrospect”, in O.F. Hamouda and J.N. Smithin (eds), Keynes 
and Public Policy after Fifty Years, vol. 2, E.Elgar, pp. 23-31. 
Samuelson, P. (1946), ‘Lord Keynes and the General Theory’, Econometrica, 14 (July), pp. 187-200. 
Skidelsky, R. (1983), John Maynard Keynes. Vol. I, London: Macmillan. 
Slutsky, E. (1937), "The Summation of Random Causes as the Source of Cyclical Processes", 1927 (in Econometrica, 
1937) 
Staehle, H. (1937)  “Short-period Variations in the distribution of incomes and the ‘Propensity to Consume’”, Review of 
Economic Statistics, 19, pp. 133-143.   32
Staehle, H. (1938), “New considerations on the distribution of incomes and the ‘Propensity to Consume’”, Review of 
Economic Statistics , 20, pp. 134-141 
Staehle, H. “A rejoinder”, RES, 21, 1939, pp. 129-130 
Stone, R. (1978), Keynes, Political Arithmetic and Econometrics, Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. 64, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Tinbergen, J. (1935), “Annual Survey: Suggestions on Quantitative Business Cycle Theory”, Econometrica, pp. 241-
308.  
Tinbergen, J. (1937), An Econometric Approach to Business Cycle Problems, Impasses Economiques,Herman &C., 
Paris. 
Tinbergen, J. (1939a), Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories, vol. I: A Method and Its Application in Investment 
Activity, Geneva: League of Nations. 
Tinbergen, J. (1939b), Statistical Testing of Business-Cycle Theories, vol. II: Business Cycles in the USA, 1919-1932, 
Geneva: League of Nations. 
Tinbergen, J. (1940a), “On a Method of Statistical Business Research. A Reply”, Economic Journal, March, pp. 141-54.  
Tinbergen, J. (1940b), “Econometric Business Cycle Research”, The Review of Economic Studies, 7, 73-90. 
Tintner, G. (1941), “Review of Business Cycles in the United States of America, 1919-1932”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 4, 618-22. 
Yule (1927), “On the Method of Investigating Periodicities in Disturbed Series", 1927, Philosophical Transactions of 
Royal Society. 
 